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1 "Our moral leadership is grounded principally in the power of our example -not through an effort to impose our system on other peoples…America must demonstrate through words and deeds the resilience of our values and Constitution. For if we compromise our values in pursuit of security, we will undermine both; if we fortify them, we will sustain a key source of our strength and leadership in the world -one that sets us apart from our enemies and our potential competitors."
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INTRODUCTION
The National Security Strategy of 2010 (NSS) makes clear that the United States' adherence to its own values and democratic principles is inextricably linked to its national security. The same document, however, illustrates the complexity of this proposition. The NSS and a variety of other strategic documents 2 consistently emphasize two concepts: the enduring importance of alliances and coalitions 3 and the significance of U.S. support to international rule of law. In practical terms, however, these concepts can be deeply contradictory; while the NSS emphasizes partnerships and multi-lateral engagement, there is a widening gap between the U.S.
and its traditional partners regarding international law.
The United States, while consistently espousing support for the rule of law, has established a strong trend of abstaining from treaties and other instruments that it perceives will encroach on its sovereignty. There are a wide variety of such treaties, from human rights (Additional Protocols I & II to the Geneva Convention) to climate change (Kyoto Protocols) to arms control (Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty), including those related to national security that seem to be firmly in line with American values. While the U.S. must continue to 1 Barrack Obama, National Security Strategy, (Washington D.C.: The White House, 2010), 10. 2 Including the more recent (2012) Department of Defense strategic guidance document "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense" as well as joint doctrine. 3 An "alliance" is different than a "coalition" and, while the US is allies with several nations discussed in this paper, the paper will use the more inclusive term "coalition" for brevity and simplicity. According to JP 1-02, an alliance is defined as: "The relationship that results from a formal agreement (e.g., treaty) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members." A coalition is defined as: "An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. guard its sovereignty, it must also acknowledge the link between its support of international rule of law and its legitimacy in the eyes of the world. The following cases represent emerging international legal norms that may strain traditionally strong alliances and partnerships enough to limit the U.S.'s ability to achieve its national security goals. The legacy strategy of avoiding international legal engagement, combined with evolving international legal norms, will complicate the U.S.'s ability to address global security concerns multilaterally. The U.S. must incorporate this changing legal landscape in determining its future strategy regarding international law or risk a reduction of American legitimacy and influence, which can impair achievement of national security goals.
International law is represented by a wide variety of institutions, but the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or the Court) is unique in that it has multilateral jurisdiction over 47
European nations. 4 Since 1959, the ECtHR's purpose has been to rule "on individual or State applications alleging violations of the civil and political rights set out in the European Convention on Human Rights." 5 In 1998, with the adoption of Protocol No. 11, individuals were allowed to petition the court directly, but only after exhausting their case through domestic courts. This development is key to two cases of particular consequence to U.S. national security:
Al Jedda v. United Kingdom (UK), and Smith and Others v. the Ministry of Defence (MoD).
Before detailing these cases, however, it is useful to examine the context of the relationship between the U.S. and ECtHR member states. Further, the court concluded:
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there must be a presumption that the Security Council does not intend to impose any obligation on Member States to breach fundamental principles of human rights…it is to be expected that clear and explicit language would be used were the Security Council to intend States to take particular measures which would conflict with their obligations under human rights law.
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This conclusion by the Court has particularly far-reaching implications for future cooperation between the U.S. and ECtHR member states. With Al-Jedda, the Court imposes on ECtHR member states a broader responsibility than the U.S. to safeguard human rights and holds those states responsible for human rights violations even when operating under a UN resolution (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non--compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfillment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. continue to depend to achieve its national security goals. While the U.S. will (and should) retain its ability to act unilaterally, this approach is not without risk, primarily because multilateral action is widely considered to be more legitimate; too much unilateral action may actually reduce U.S. influence in global affairs and therefore impair its ability to achieve its national security goals.
It is reasonable to assume that the U.S. will never fall under the jurisdiction of the ECtHR or even subjugate its citizens to the International Criminal Court (ICC The Smith decision endangers this tradition. Imagine the challenge of determining a theater strategic coalition command and control structure where the UK is bound not only by existing international law but by the extended application of the ECHR and duty of care; it is reasonable to conclude the UK will be much less likely to place its forces under U.S. command without such significant caveats that the unity of command principle would be compromised. At the tactical level, it is likely that a British commander would be reluctant to allow his or her troops to ride in an American vehicle or aircraft, or live on a joint base, if it did not meet duty of care standards (which are not -and cannot -be clearly defined; it is impossible to prove a commander could not have done more). 27 Similarly, a British commander may refuse to participate in detention However, it is also clear that to go to war with Assad -that is what it will be -without the sanction of a UN Security Council resolution would set a terrible precedent. After the mission creep of the Libyan operation, it would amount to nothing less than a clear statement by the US and its allies that we were the arbiters of international right and wrong when we felt that right was on our side. What could we do or say if, at some point, the Russians or Chinese adopted a similar argument? What could we say if they attacked a country without a UN resolution because they claimed it was right and cited our action as a precedent? Legal rectitude may not amount to much, but it is all we have. would give the U.S. effective veto power over its decisions. Again, because it has not ratified UNCLOS, the U.S. has no influence in the ISA's discussions or decisions. UNCLOS demonstrates that there are ways to participate in international legal institutions while protecting sovereignty; it is common, in fact, to ratify treaties with caveats. These reasons, among many others, lead UNCLOS advocates to conclude that continued abstention reduces U.S. influence in regional and global affairs and harms U.S. national security.
CONCLUSION
The United States prefers to confront global security concerns multilaterally and in accordance with international rule of law. Recent decisions by the ECtHR, however, widen the legal gap between the U.S. and its traditional partners, impairing the formation of future coalitions. While these decisions may seem to validate the legacy U.S. approach to international law, there is substantial and increasing risk to rigid abstention from any future international legal engagement. In the current international security environment, multilateral action and adherence to international legal norms confer legitimacy. Even though Al-Jedda and Smith represent increasing barriers to multilateral engagement, the U.S. must recognize that unilateral action and maintaining strict sovereignty may result in a loss of legitimacy and influence; UNCLOS is a timely and cautionary example. Simply put, the erosion of legitimacy caused by avoiding membership in international legal institutions may soon outweigh the benefits of strict sovereignty. Consequently, the U.S. must incorporate emerging international legal norms into its future national security strategy, balancing sovereignty with support to the rule of law in order to preserve its legitimacy and influence, thereby promoting the achievement of American national security goals.
